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Abstract
This article sets the stage for a special issue that exam-
ines the interplay between subnational and suprana-
tional governance. It begins by discussing how the
territorial architecture of government has become more
multilevel as national governments have shifted
authority both downwards to subnational governments
and upwards to international and supranational insti-
tutions. Next, we argue that this multilevel structure
emanates from a tension between the drive to reap the
functional benefits of scale diversity in a globalizing
economy and the pressures arising from collective self-
rule. We build on the research in this special issue to
highlight some tangible effects of this tension for pol-
icy, politics, and polity. Subnational and supranational
governance are conventionally perceived as separate
phenomena with distinct consequences, and yet they
are intimately connected in a fluid territorial architec-
ture of multilevel governance.
1 | INTRODUCTION
This special issue showcases recent research that transcends methodological nationalism, the
notion that the national state is the natural political form in the modern world and the default
basis for comparison. The four articles in this issue examine how the simultaneous dispersion
of authority to subnational governments and to international and supranational institutions has
affected policy outcomes (policy), political competition (politics), and the architecture of
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governance (polity) in contemporary Western societies. We begin by describing how the territo-
rial architecture of government has become multilevel since WWII. We then propose that mul-
tilevel governance is a response to a tension between two forces in a globalizing economy: the
drive to exploit the functional benefits of governance at diverse territorial scale and the pres-
sures arising from the desire for self-governance. This tension is expressed in a variety of ways,
and in the remainder of the introduction, we highlight some tangible effects for policy, politics,
and polity. We conclude that subnational and supranational governance are intimately
connected.
2 | A CHANGING TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE OF
GOVERNMENT
The past seven decades have seen an unprecedented transformation in the territorial structure
of government. No level of government has escaped major reform, but the extent of change
appears to be greater as one moves from the local to the global. Local government has a history
that stretches to the beginnings of civilization, and today every country has some form of village
or town council that handles local public goods such as refuse disposal or road maintenance. In
most countries, both the responsibilities and territorial scale of local governments have grown
in response to urbanization and the knowledge economy (Ladner et al., 2016; Ladner &
Keuffer, 2021; Page, 1991; Resnick, 2021; Sellers et al., 2020).
Regional governance is more contested and more variable across time and space. The past
seven decades have seen an unprecedented growth in regional authority which has affected
democracies worldwide (Eaton et al., 2010; Hooghe & Marks, 2016; Marks et al., 2008). The
European continent has been at the cutting edge. Since the 1960s, new tiers of subnational gov-
ernment have been set up in 25 European countries, 15 of which have regional elections
(Schakel, 2018, p. 687). Around 47% of the EU population lives in regions endowed with pri-
mary legislative powers (Tatham, 2018, p. 679). Substantial self-rule has been extended to sev-
eral territorial communities, including the Azores, the Basque country, Catalonia, Corsica,
Flanders, Scotland, South-Tirol, and Wales. Metropolitan tiers have been created or strength-
ened in France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK, as well as in Brazil, Colombia, India, Indo-
nesia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey (OECD, 2014, 2015).1 Regional
authority in Europe now reaches into agriculture and fisheries (Carter & Smith, 2008), educa-
tion (Dupuy, 2020; Kleider et al., 2018), immigration (Adam & Hepburn, 2019; Tatham, 2020),
health (Costa-Font & Greer, 2013; Piccoli, 2020), and welfare (Kleider, 2018; Vampa, 2016).
As regional self-government has grown, it has sometimes spilled into the national arena,
taking the form of shared rule, co-decision making for the country as a whole (Hooghe &
Marks, 2016, pp. 34–37). Shared rule is characteristic of federal states, and it can also be found
in some regionalized states, such as Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Bolivia. Many asymmet-
rical arrangements in more centralized states give regions a form of bilateral shared rule over
national policy in the region itself as in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in the UK, Por-
tugal's Madeira and Azores, the Åland islands in Finland, Jeju in South Korea, the two autono-
mous regions in Nicaragua, or Aceh and Papua in Indonesia. In Europe, regional shared rule
has spilled up to the European Union (EU) (Tatham, 2011). Decentralization has also been con-
ducive to greater Europeanization among regional actors. For example, interest groups in more
authoritative regions tend to target European decision making more intently than those in less
authoritative regions (Lopez & Tatham, 2018). On occasion, regional governance can alter
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European outcomes, as when in 2016 the parliament of Wallonia blocked the EU-Canada Com-
prehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) until it received concessions on dispute settle-
ment and agricultural tariffs (Tatham, 2018, pp. 680–683).
The rise of regional governance has been matched by deepening international governance.
The restructuring of authority has been most transformative in Europe. The EU is, at once,
international and domestic, federal and confederal, supranational and intergovernmental. It
encompasses 448 million people in a multilevel polity that transforms nationals into European
citizens, and its authoritative competences touch virtually every public policy. A comparative
measure that assesses an international organization's portfolio finds that the EU is the only
international organization covering the entire range of 25 policies (Hooghe et al., 2019b, pp. 63–
64). The EU's supranational institutions, including the European Court of Justice, the Commis-
sion, and the Central Bank, have been empowered in a sequence of reforms. In addition, the
EU's Parliament has metamorphosed from a nominated consultative assembly into a directly
elected transnational parliament with extensive law-making powers. EU laws have direct effect
and supremacy over national and subnational legal orders.
The supranational empowerment of the EU is exceptional in depth and breadth, but it is
part of a larger trend of world regionalization (Börzel & Risse, 2016; Lenz et al., 2019; Rocabert
et al., 2019). Some 33 regional international organizations (RIOs) have been empowered over
the past 25 years (Hooghe et al., 2019b). One remarkable development is the growing delegation
of authority by national states to independent non-state bodies: RIO secretariats, courts or arbi-
tration panels, assemblies, and, occasionally, bodies of independent experts. The Measure of
International Authority (MIA) finds that 25 of 33 RIOs have gained authority since 1995, and
just two have lost authority. The average increase in delegated powers is equivalent to setting
up an independent court that can make binding decisions or granting an IO secretariat agenda-
setting powers on policy and the budget. Twenty-four RIOs broadened their policy portfolios,
and just four saw their portfolio contract. On average, a RIO widened its policy portfolio from
10 to 13 policies.
In recent years, the rise of international authority has entered a domestic political debate in
which populist nationalists campaign to constrain supranational organizations, limit trade, and
stop migration (De Vries et al., 2021; De Wilde et al., 2019; Mutz, 2018). If they succeed, we
may witness a second transformation away from transnationalism toward a fragmented, “my
nation first” global disorder dominated by states and their regional groupings. The liberal inter-
national order survived the first Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, but
it now faces a double threat: a second Cold War, this time between the United States and
China, and populist nationalism within the West itself (Hooghe et al., 2019a).
Central governments have played a pivotal role in orchestrating, mediating, and sometimes
resisting the territorial transformation of governance. They are both actors and witnesses; some-
times taking a leading role in reform and at other times a reactive one (Harbers et al., 2021,
pp. 1–5; Jensen et al., 2014, pp. 1237–1243). Alongside the vertical territorial re-organization of
authority, many governments have decentered authority horizontally to non-majoritarian insti-
tutions (Thatcher & Sweet, 2002). These included reforms to increase central bank autonomy
(Garriga, 2016), privatization (Schmitt, 2014), agencification (Jordana et al., 2018; Verhoest,
2018), and judicial review (Stone Sweet, 2017; Stone Sweet & Mathews, 2019), many of which
insulated decision making from democratic pressures (Peters, 2016, 2018).
Subnational and supranational governance are conventionally perceived as separate phe-
nomena with distinct consequences. Our point of departure is that they are elements of an
interconnected system of multilevel governance encompassing authority from the village to the
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globe (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, 2020; Ostrom et al., 1999). However, the idea that subnational
and supranational governance are two aspects of a single phenomenon raises some fundamen-
tal puzzles. How do these subsystems interact? In what ways do they combine to produce a trip-
tych of polity, policy, and political outcomes? The interplay of supranational and subnational
governance is a core puzzle in the study of multilevel governance and the concern of this spe-
cial issue.
3 | SCALE, COMMUNITY, AND MULTILEVEL
GOVERNANCE
We begin by considering the possibility that multilevel governance has an overarching logic:
the tension between the functional benefits of scale diversity and the pressures arising from col-
lective identity. Each of these factors has a rich literature, and while each has its proponents,
we believe that they are most accurate in combination.
The functionalist premise is that the scale at which a public good is most efficiently pro-
vided depends on the costs and benefits of centralization for the public good in question. The
classic statement is Wallace Oates' decentralization theorem (1972) that conceives a trade-off
between scale economies and extra-regional externalities, which pull government up to the
national level, and territorial heterogeneity of preferences, which pulls government down to the
local level. While fiscal federalists conceive this trade-off as domestic (Musgrave, 1959; Oates,
2005), there is no need to limit it within states. International relations scholars adopt a func-
tionalist logic when they explain international institutions as instruments for reducing the
transaction costs of cooperation among states (Keohane, 1984).
Few scholars tie these insights into a single theory that applies both within and among
states. An exception is Alberto Alesina, who in The Size of Nations (1997, 2003) co-authored
with Enrico Spolaore, models how economic globalization makes small jurisdictions economi-
cally viable, thereby tilting the trade-off between size and heterogeneity toward the latter.
Alesina and Spolaore conceptualize heterogeneity in terms of policy preferences: what matters
for jurisdictional design in The Size of Nations is the policies that are delivered to an individual
in relation to the taxes they must pay (Alesina & Spolaore, 2003, p. 18). The more heteroge-
neous a country, the greater the disparity between the policies that a government provides and
the preferences of individual citizens.
However, providing individuals with the policies they want is not the same as giving them
the authority to collectively determine those policies. Self-rule is the independent exercise of
authority. A shortcoming of the functionalist theory of governance is that it takes for granted its
most problematic feature—the Who Question: Who gets to exercise governance; which groups
are given the right to make laws? A territorial group may demand self-rule even if the central
government tailors public goods to their preferences. Analysis of policy preferences, no matter
how sophisticated, cannot explain why some groups demand the right to exercise authority over
their own laws.
The premise of a community logic is that preferences over governance are shaped by collec-
tive identity as well as by policy preferences. Governance in this approach is an expression of
sociality among participants. The root of the modern concept of community is Aristotle's
koinonia, literally translated as “sharing in common” (Liddell & Scott, 1940). Communities
facilitate the provision of public goods because they nurture social networks, repeated interac-
tion, and long time-horizons that diminish free riding. In Elinor Ostrom's (1990, p. 88) words,
4 TATHAM ET AL.
the capacity for providing public goods is enhanced where “Individuals have shared a past and
expect to share a future.”
An extensive literature examines the effect of community on jurisdictional design within
states and among states. Within states, peripheral groups are most liable to demand self-rule.
Geographical isolation, linguistic distinctiveness, and a history of independence can lead mem-
bers of a group to see themselves as a people entitled to self-rule. The geo-historical bases for
such identities are especially strong in Europe and Asia (Shair-Rosenfield et al., 2021). Among
states, international organizations that can tap into some similar culture, religion, geographical
location, political or legal institutions are most likely to sustain general-purpose government
(Hooghe et al., 2019a, 2019b).
However, the implication of community for governance is double-edged. Norms that facili-
tate governance within communities can constrain governance among them. While a sense of
shared community can diminish free riding, it can also divide the world into “us” and “them,”
“insiders” and “outsiders.” Hence, communities are settings of parochial altruism, combining
empathy to those within the group and antipathy to those beyond (Bernhard et al., 2006).
Such feelings are socially constructed and politically contested (Keating, 2021). What shared
norms are necessary for the collective provision of public goods? To what extent does sociality
depend on speaking the same language, adhering to the same religion, or living in spatial prox-
imity? A key finding here is that where conceptions of community are exclusive, multilevel gov-
ernance is contentious because it shares rule among, as well as within, peoples.
Hence, a jurisdictional design that reflects community may stand in tension to a design on
functionalist principles (Hooghe & Marks, 2020; Kleider, 2020). From a functionalist perspec-
tive, the optimal design is to bundle policies in a limited number of exponentially spaced tiers
reflecting spatial externalities and economies of scale (Hooghe & Marks, 2016). From a commu-
nity perspective, the structure of multilevel governance will reflect the pattern of collective
identities and the political struggle over whether they are conceived as inclusive or exclusive of
overarching governance.
4 | THIS ISSUE
The effects of scale and community on jurisdictional design, and the effects of multilevel gover-
nance on policy, politics, and polity inform the contributions to this special issue.
Several contributions tackle the relative strength of functionality and community for the ter-
ritorial architecture of government. In the first comparative survey of its kind, Tatham and
Bauer (2021) probe regional elite preferences over government authority across regions,
national states, and the EU in 18 policy domains. Using data from a survey conducted in
12 countries and 68 regions, the authors find that the jurisdictional preferences of directly elec-
ted regional politicians and top regional civil servants are shaped both by functional and com-
munity factors.
Functional pressures are expressed in the preference of elites in larger regions for greater
authority over their own region. Elites in smaller regions are not averse to the idea but are con-
siderably less intent. So the sheer population size of a region affects preferences over regional
empowerment. Identity, tapped by measures of territorial attachment, is also a powerful influ-
ence. A feeling of attachment to their region leads elites to want more decentralization and to
disempower their parent state. This is a general pattern: Place attachment produces a desire to
strengthen the corresponding tier of government and weaken those at adjacent levels. Elites
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who are attached to Europe wish to empower the EU and reduce national competences, while
those who are attached to the nation wish to empower the state and diminish both regional and
EU competences.
Tatham and Bauer find the same effect when they assess identity using regional indicators,
such as whether a region has the status of a minority nation (Brigevich, 2018). Hence, both indi-
vidual and aggregate data confirm the effect of identity for preferences over self-government.
These results are robust to potentially confounding influences, including the current allocation
of authority, attitudes regarding the EU, its member states, and subsidiarity, as well as individ-
ual economic and social characteristics.
The interplay between functional and identitarian variables is picked up by Jurado and
Leon (2021) who investigate whether globalization among states triggers jurisdictional reform
within them. Using data from 78 countries from 1970 to 2010, the authors investigate the juris-
dictional effect of globalization, which they conceptualize as economic interdependence and
measure with the KOF index for trade and financial openness. Globalization, they find, spurs
decentralization and is mediated by communal identity. This has a functionalist basis:
decentralized governments can respond more effectively to asymmetric shocks arising from
globalization.2 Communal identity, mobilized through regionalist parties, amplifies the effect of
globalization on decentralization. Where regionalist parties are strong, the effect of globaliza-
tion is twice as strong as in a country without regionalist parties. In short, globalization makes
smaller polities more viable.
Jurado and Leon draw on the idea that an international trade regime opens the door to
larger markets. When a region trades beyond national borders, membership of the national
state may even become a liability under national protectionism (Alesina & Spolaore, 2003;
Jolly, 2015; Marks & Hooghe, 2000). Hence, this can be expected to intensify secessionist
pressures. This finding is consistent with Tatham and Bauer, who conclude that regional
elites in minority nations are most strongly in favor of strengthening regional government.
Since minority nationalism and regional party success are highly correlated (Massetti &
Schakel, 2016), both studies suggest that regional identity provides fertile ground for
decentralization.
In sum, functional pressures triggered by jurisdictional size (Tatham & Bauer, 2021) and by
globalization (Jurado & Leon, 2021) are important influences on the territorial architecture of
government. And these functional pressures exist alongside, and sometimes in tension with,
community effects arising from territorial identity (Jurado & Leon, 2021; Tatham &
Bauer, 2021).
A second theme of the special issue concerns the effects of dispersion of authority on pol-
icymaking, politics, and the polity (Tatham & Mbaye, 2018). On the policy dimension, Peters
(2021) investigates how decentralization and globalization affect the citizen-policy link. Looking
at social policy, Peters analyzes the relationship between citizen preferences and public spend-
ing for 23 democracies between 2002 and 2012. She finds that decentralization and globalization
influence central government responsiveness in contrasting ways. The gap between what citi-
zens want from social policy and what central governments provide in spending grows smaller
in more decentralized countries, and this effect is significant both cross-sectionally and tempo-
rally. Importantly, this appears driven chiefly by a region's shared rule. The effect of shared rule
is three times as large as that of self-rule. In contrast, globalization has the opposite effect.
Countries that are less exposed to globalization are more responsive than more globalized coun-
tries. The upshot is that both decentralization and globalization affect policymaking beyond
their own territorial scale, but in countervailing ways.
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On the politics dimension, Schakel (2021) highlights how regional and European electoral
politics are intertwined. Comparing European election results for 209 regions in 11 EU member
states since 1979, the author finds strong evidence of prospective voting in European elections
in which voters send a signal about their regional government. They do so by rewarding politi-
cal parties that are in government at the regional level, especially when these parties are in
opposition at the national level. This effect is magnified in regions with extensive regional
authority, such as Flanders, Catalonia, or Scotland, and when regional elections precede
European elections. This article complements research that shows how European electoral out-
comes have trickle-down effects for national elections, and it therefore seems reasonable to
argue that regions affect national elections both directly (Dinas & Foos, 2017; Spoon & Jones
West, 2015) and indirectly via European elections (Dinas & Riera, 2018; Schakel, 2021).
On the polity dimension, Tatham and Bauer (2021) examine whether regional elite prefer-
ences on the attribution of competences are shaped by the existing distribution of authority.
Controlling for confounding factors, they show that elites in authoritative regions favor further
shifts of authority away from the national state and toward the EU. In other words, dispersion
of authority appears to strengthen preferences for greater dispersion of authority (Brancati,
2006; Tatham & Bauer, 2021).
5 | DIFFERENTIAL ARCHITECTURES: SELF-RULE
AND SHARED RULE
Regional authority can be unpacked into self-rule—the authority exercised by a regional gov-
ernment over those who live in the region—and shared rule—the authority exercised by a
regional government in the country as a whole (or simply at a higher scale). Self-rule and
shared rule usually correlate highly (Hooghe et al., 2016) and yet they have contrasting conse-
quences. For example, self-rule appears to produce regional disparities, while shared rule
appears to have no such effect (Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose, 2013, p. 397). Within the European
context, regions with self-rule have several distinctive effects, including a greater likelihood of
having an office in Brussels and of it being well-staffed; a greater likelihood of membership in a
trans-regional association at the EU level; or a lesser likelihood of using consultative instru-
ments domestically on EU affairs. In each case, shared rule does precisely the opposite
(Donas & Beyers, 2013, p. 540; Huwyler et al., 2018, p. 767; Tatham & Thau, 2014, p. 265).
Several contributions in this special issue explore the distinct effects of self-rule and shared
rule. Tatham and Bauer (2021) show how self-rule induces regional elites to want to shift cen-
tral government competences to the EU, whereas shared rule does not. Jurado and Leon (2021)
reveal how both dimensions are affected by economic globalization, but that self-rule is boosted
to a greater extent than shared rule. This echoes findings regarding the differential effect of EU
candidacy and length of membership on self-rule and shared rule (Chacha, 2020; Gomez Díaz &
Gomez Díaz, 2020). The contribution by Peters (2021) underlines that both self-rule and shared
rule strengthen the opinion-policy link at the national level, but shared rule does so to a much
greater extent than self-rule. Self-rule, by providing citizens with directly elected representatives
whose policy portfolio is growing, supplies an additional platform—an alternative territorial
arena—for interest aggregation and articulation. Shared rule, however, furnishes an institution-
alized channel through which citizens (or their representatives) can co-determine national pol-
icy. If self-rule can function as an echo-chamber amplifying citizen preferences over national
policy, shared rule institutes a direct lever over central affairs. Perhaps it should not surprise us,
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then, that the effect of shared rule on responsiveness “is triple the size” of that for self-rule
(Peters, 2021).
6 | THE ARCHITECTURE OF COMPROMISE: BETWEEN
AUTONOMY AND INTERDEPENDENCE
It is undeniable that many changes in the structure of authority are triggered by a desire for
self-government, whether symbolic or substantial. This is true at the subnational level. The Cat-
alan and Scottish cases illustrate this dramatically, and numerous reforms in unitary countries
reflect the same process in less spectacular fashion (Saarts, 2020; Sijstermans & Brown Swan,
2021; Trinn & Schulte, 2020). The same logic operates at the national level too. Brexit reveals
the potency of narratives about “taking back control” despite the cost to scale benefits (Menon
& Wager, 2020). Meanwhile, the member states of the European Economic Area/European Free
Trade Association (EEA/EFTA) have struck a different sort of compromise between national
sovereignty and scale benefits by relinquishing political influence in the EU in return for access
to the EU single market (Egeberg & Trondal, 1999; Fossum & Graver, 2018; Panara, 2021).
Hence, demands for decentralized governance and differentiation express themselves at multi-
ple levels.
This desire for self-government has to navigate the reality of interdependence among global-
ized democracies. This recognition has provided the cornerstone for European integration as
well as other supranational ventures (Hooghe et al., 2017; Lundgren et al., 2018). Similarly, it
has framed secessionist debates at the subnational level in terms of the seceding entity's rela-
tionship with existing supranational structures such as the EU (Chamon & Van der Loo, 2014;
Loughlin, 2021; Muro & Vlaskamp, 2016).
The result is a tension, and occasional struggle, between a desire for autonomy and an
acknowledgement of interdependence. This tension is manifest at the subnational level where
greater self-rule (i.e. autonomy or self-government) has been tempered by stronger shared rule
(i.e. interdependence or co-government). Similarly, at the national level, sovereignty move-
ments have developed in tandem with the creation and empowerment of international organi-
zations and supranational governance.
Nothing provokes this tension between autonomy and interdependence more than globali-
zation.3 Trade and financial openness have created transnational interdependencies which
provide some economic actors with options to elude government regulation. As economic
interdependence has perforated national borders, the capacity of governments to regulate glob-
alization depends increasingly on their willingness to coordinate across subnational, national,
and supranational levels. But here their desire for autonomy may interfere with their functional
need for coordination. The upshot is a territorial governance architecture that is both more fluid
and patchier in its capacity to project authoritative control.
The magnitude of interdependence resulting from globalization becomes starkly visible in times
of crises. The financial crisis of 2008 originated from the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers in the
United States before spreading across the Northern globe. The Covid-19 pandemic purportedly
started through a bat-pangolin-human transmission erupting at the Huanan seafood market in the
city of Wuhan (Hubei Province, China) before sending half of the world population in lockdown. As
globalization deepens interdependence, it upsets established patterns and routines and provides new
constraints and opportunities for different groups of actors. While globalization multiplies opportu-
nities for some economic agents (especially, corporate actors and mobile capital), it imposes costs on
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people and sectors that are less mobile. And it generates huge governance challenges for territorially
bounded public authorities. It is hence not surprising to observe that globalization interferes with
citizen-government relations and contributes to the erosion of the opinion-policy link, a foundation
of modern democracy (Peters, 2021).
Analyses that seek to understand the interplay between autonomy and interdependence
need to acknowledge that these tensions are—by essence—multilevel. And this should be
reflected in their approach. Globalization, for example, has differentiated effects across territo-
rial scales. In addition, it can have both direct and indirect effects on outcomes. We illustrate
this in Figure 1, which summarizes the combined results of the studies by Peters (2021) and by
Jurado and Leon (2021). Figure 1 shows that globalization directly erodes central government
responsiveness (Peters, 2021) but that it indirectly reinforces it through its positive effect on
regional authority (Jurado & Leon, 2021). By provoking increases in regional authority, globali-
zation seems to generate a response to its own shortcomings. It remains an open question as to
whether globalization induces regional authority (as an endogenous development) or whether
regional authority stems from governments' active efforts to mitigate the negative fallout of
globalization (as a purposeful riposte). Either way, the fact that globalization directly erodes
responsiveness, but indirectly enhances it by strengthening regional authority is indicative of
how the confluence of autonomy and interdependence pressures play out differently across ter-
ritorial scales in both forthright and roundabout ways.
We view these complementary findings as a further illustration of the countervailing pres-
sures generated by globalization on, not only the architecture of government (i.e. the polity
dimension), but also on political and policy outcomes. Globalization is one of the ultimate
embodiments of interdependence. Naturally, it constrains national governments in ways that
erode responsiveness toward their own citizens (see also: Ezrow & Hellwig, 2014). But it also
provides opportunities for greater regional authority (see also: Alesina et al., 2000, p. 1293)
which, in turn, seems to somewhat redress the responsiveness deficit it generated in the first
FIGURE 1 Globalization, regional authority, and responsiveness.
Note: Visualization of the combined results presented by Peters (2021) and by Jurado and Leon (2021).
RAI = Regional Authority Index; KOF = Index of Globalization; G = Globalization. Signs represent the
direction and approximate strength of the relationship. Solid lines represent findings by Peters (2021). Dashed
lines represent findings by Jurado and Leon (2021). Jurado and Leon's findings concern Economic Globalization
and various subdimensions thereof
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instance (see Figure 1). Globalization's varied effects elegantly illustrate the ongoing compro-
mises between autonomy and interdependence and how these play out at various territorial
scales across the policy-politics-polity triptych.
7 | CONCLUSION
The twin trends of regionalization and internationalization against the backdrop of globaliza-
tion provide the focus for this special issue, and each contribution problematizes how these
interact to shape political outcomes. The research presented here reveals that the balance
between autonomy and interdependence, and between self-rule and shared rule, has no given
answer. Arbitrations between subnational, national, and supranational governance are crucial
as they decisively shape policies, politics, and polities. In sum, as our societies have become
increasingly multilevel so should our analyses.
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1 Figures on regional tiers and metropolitan governance are from RAI v.3 (Shair-Rosenfield et al., 2021).
2 Jurado and Leon's research throws up an interesting puzzle for future research. While functionality and com-
munity emerge as the most powerful drivers for variation in decentralization, they find evidence that territorial
inequality may act as a brake on decentralization, and they conjecture that this may be due to political pres-
sures to alleviate potential disruptive effects of globalization through tax equalization.
3 We here understand globalization as a threefold process that: (a) erodes national boundaries, (b) integrates
economies, technologies, governance and cultures, and (c) creates relations of mutual interdependence (see
Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008).
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